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Creative Destruction and Subjective Well-Being†
By Philippe Aghion, Ufuk Akcigit, Angus Deaton, and Alexandra Roulet*
In this paper we analyze the relationship between turnover-driven 
growth and subjective well-being. Our model of innovation-led 
growth and unemployment predicts that:  (i) the effect of creative 
destruction on expected individual welfare should be unambiguously 
positive if we control for unemployment, less so if we do not;  (ii) job 
creation has a positive and job destruction has a negative impact 
on well-being;  (iii) job destruction has a less negative impact in 
areas with more generous unemployment insurance policies; and  (iv) job creation has a more positive effect on individuals that are 
more forward-looking. The empirical analysis using cross-sectional 
MSA (metropolitan statistical area)-level and individual-level data 
provide empirical support to these predictions. (JEL I31, J63, J65, 
O33, O38)
Does higher (per capita) GDP or GDP growth increase happiness? The existing 
empirical literature on happiness and income looks at how various measures of sub-
jective well-being (SWB) relate to income or income growth, but without looking 
in further detail at what drives the growth process and at how the determinants of 
growth affect well-being. In this paper, we provide a first attempt at filling this gap.
More specifically, we look at how an important engine of growth, namely 
Schumpeterian creative destruction with its resulting flow of entry and exit of firms 
and jobs, affects SWB differently for different types of individuals and in different 
types of labor markets.
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Thus, in the first part of the paper we develop a simple Schumpeterian model of 
growth and unemployment to organize our thoughts and generate predictions on 
the potential effects of turnover on life satisfaction. In this model, growth results 
from quality-improving innovations. Each time a new innovator enters a sector, the 
worker currently employed in that sector loses her job and the firm posts a new 
vacancy. Production in the sector resumes with the new technology only when the 
firm has found a new suitable worker. Life satisfaction is captured by the expected 
discounted valuation of an individual’s future earnings. In the model, a higher rate 
of turnover has both direct and indirect effects on life satisfaction. The direct effects 
are that, everything else equal, more turnover translates into both a higher probabil-
ity of becoming unemployed for the employed, which reduces life satisfaction, and 
a higher probability for the unemployed to find a new job, which increases life sat-
isfaction. The indirect effect is that a higher rate of turnover implies a higher growth 
externality and therefore a higher net present value of future earnings: this enhances 
life satisfaction. Overall, a first prediction of the model is that a higher turnover 
rate increases well-being more when controlling for aggregate unemployment than 
when not controlling for aggregate unemployment. A second prediction is that job 
creation increases and job destruction decreases well-being. A third prediction is 
that job destruction has a less negative effect on well-being, the more generous 
are unemployment benefits. A fourth prediction is that job creation increases future 
well-being more for more forward-looking individuals.1
In the second part of the paper we test the predictions of the model using 
 cross-sectional metropolitan statistical area (MSA)-level US data. To measure cre-
ative destruction we follow Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) and use their mea-
sure of job turnover, defined as the job creation rate plus the job destruction rate.2 
The data come from the Census Bureau's Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS) and 
are at the MSA level. In addition, we also use the Longitudinal Employer-Household 
Dynamics (LEHD) data from the Census Bureau, which provide information on 
hires, separations, employment, and thus turnover, also at the MSA level. To mea-
sure SWB, we use the Cantril ladder of life from the Gallup Healthways Well-Being 
Index (Gallup), which asks individuals about both current and future well-being. The 
Cantril ladder is based on the following questions: “Imagine a ladder with steps num-
bered from 0 at the bottom to 10 at the top; the top of the ladder represents the best 
possible life for you and the bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible life 
for you. On which step of the ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at 
this time? And which level of the ladder do you anticipate to achieve in five years?”3
We investigate whether Schumpeterian creative destruction affects these mea-
sures of well-being positively or negatively, by regressing our measures of SWB 
on our creative destruction variables. The empirical analysis using cross-sectional 
MSA-level data on SWB and job turnover vindicates the theoretical predictions: 
1 In the online Appendix, we characterize the transitional dynamics of the model and also extend the analysis 
to the case where job destruction can be partly exogenous, or to the case where the turnover rate is endogenously 
determined by a free entry condition. 
2 We have also looked at firm turnover, namely the sum of the establishment entry rate and the establishment 
exit rate, with similar results. 
3 In online Appendix A2, we also check the robustness of our results to a SWB measure from another dataset: 
the Life Satisfaction question from the Behavioral Risk Factor and Surveillance System, which asks respondents 
“In general how satisfied are you with your life?” 
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namely, we find that: (i) the effect of creative destruction on well-being is positive 
when we control for MSA-level unemployment and less so if we do not; (ii) the 
effects of job creation and job destruction on well-being are positive and negative, 
respectively; and (iii) job destruction has less negative effect when unemployment 
benefits are higher. Moreover, we find some evidence that job creation has a more 
positive impact on future well-being for more forward-looking individuals when we 
use income, age, and education to proxy for patience. These results are not only con-
sistent with the theory, but they are also remarkably robust. In particular they hold 
whether looking at well-being at MSA level or at individual level, or whether using 
the BDS or the LEHD data to construct our proxy for creative destruction.
The paper relates to two main strands of literature. First, to the literature on inno-
vation-led growth, job turnover, and unemployment (e.g., see Davis, Haltiwanger, 
and Schuh 1996; Mortensen and Pissarides 1998; Aghion and Howitt 1994, 1998; 
and Aghion, Akcigit, and Howitt 2014). In particular Aghion and Howitt (1994, 
1998) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) develop Schumpeterian models of 
growth through creative destruction, where growth is driven by quality-improving 
innovations by new entrants that make existing firms and jobs become obsolete. In 
any sector where new entry occurs, the incumbent firm closes down, therefore the 
worker employed by the incumbent firm loses her job whereas the entering firm in 
the sector posts a new vacancy. Equilibrium unemployment results from assuming 
labor market frictions in the form of a Poisson matching rate between new vacan-
cies and workers looking for a new job. These papers point to two opposite effects 
of growth on unemployment. One is a “capitalization” effect whereby more growth 
reduces the rate at which firms discount the future returns from creating a new 
vacancy: this effect pushes toward creating more vacancies and thus toward reduc-
ing the equilibrium unemployment. The counteracting effect is a “creative destruc-
tion” effect whereby more growth implies a higher rate of job destruction which in 
turn tends to increase the equilibrium level of unemployment. We contribute to this 
literature by looking at the counteracting effects of innovation-led growth on SWB.
Second, the paper contributes to the literature on SWB. In spite of a now large lit-
erature on self-reported well-being,4 there is no general consensus on how seriously 
these SWB measures should be taken, or on exactly what they mean. Indeed some of 
the most exciting recent work (e.g., see Benjamin et al. 2012, 2014) is investigating 
these fundamental questions.5 In this paper, we find that life  satisfaction responds to 
4 In particular, in his seminal work, Easterlin (1974) provides evidence to the effect that, within a given coun-
try, happiness is positively correlated with income across individuals but this correlation no longer holds within a 
given country over time. This Easterlin paradox is often explained by the idea that, at least past a certain income 
threshold, additional income enters life satisfaction only in a relative way; Clark, Frijters, and Shields (2008) pro-
vides a review of this large literature of which Luttmer (2005), Clark and Senik (2010), and Card et al. (2012) are 
prominent examples. Recent work has found little evidence of thresholds and a good deal of evidence linking higher 
incomes to higher life satisfaction, both across countries and over time. Thus in his cross-country analysis of the 
Gallup World Poll, Deaton (2008) finds a relationship between log of per capita GDP and life satisfaction which is 
positive and close to linear, i.e., with a similar slope for poor and rich countries, and, if anything, steeper for rich 
countries. Stevenson and Wolfers (2013) provide both cross-country and within-country evidence of a log-linear 
relationship between per capita GDP and well-being and they also fail to find a critical “satiation” income threshold. 
Yet these issues remain far from settled, see for example the reviews by Frey and Stutzer (2002), Layard (2011), 
or Graham (2009).
5 Benjamin et al. (2012) run three surveys to look at the extent to which, when facing two alternatives, individ-
uals choose the alternative from which they anticipate the highest SWB (as measured by the Cantril ladder). They 
find that SWB and choice coincide 83 percent of the time. Benjamin et al. (2014) survey students from US medical 
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the future growth prospects that are inherent in creative destruction, even in spite of 
the related short-run unemployment effects, and at the same time we provide some 
evidence of the validity and usefulness of self-reported well-being as a measure of 
expected future material well-being. Such findings have not been documented in the 
well-being literature so far and they provide further evidence of the usefulness of 
these well-being measures.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I develops the model and generates 
predictions on the effects of turnover on SWB, and how these effects depend upon 
individual or local labor market characteristics. Section II describes the data, the 
approach underlying the empirical analysis, and presents the empirical results. 
Section III considers several robustness checks. Section IV concludes the paper. 
The Appendix contains the proofs and the online Appendix presents extensions to 
the baseline framework, additional proofs, and extra tables.
I. Theoretical Analysis
A. A Toy Model
In this section, we offer a simple model to motivate our empirical analysis. The 
source of economic growth is Schumpeterian creative destruction which at the same 
time generates endogenous obsolescence of firms and jobs. The workers in the obso-
lete firms join the unemployment pool until they are matched to a new firm. Higher 
firm turnover has both a positive effect (by increasing economic growth and by 
increasing employment prospects of unemployed workers) and a negative effect 
(by increasing the probability of currently employed workers losing their job) on 
well-being. Which effect dominates will in turn depend upon both individual char-
acteristics (e.g., discount rate and risk-aversion) and characteristics of the labor mar-
ket (e.g., unemployment benefits). To keep the analysis tractable, in what follows we 
will consider a steady-state economy with exogenous entry, risk-neutral agents, and 
only endogenous job destruction. These assumptions will be relaxed in the online 
Appendix: Section A1.1 focuses on transitional dynamics, Section A1.2 considers a 
model with exogenous job destruction, Section A1.3 considers the implications of 
risk aversion, and Section A1.4 endogenizes entry in the theoretical model.
Production Technology and Innovation.—We consider a multi-sector 
Schumpeterian growth model in continuous time. The economy is populated by a 
set of infinitely-lived and risk-neutral individuals of measure one, and discount the 
future at rate  ρ. Therefore the household Euler equation is simply
(1)  r = ρ,  
where  r is the interest rate of the economy.
schools who enroll in the National Residence Matching Program; they find that individuals’ actual choice of resi-
dence somewhat departs from individuals’ anticipated SWB rankings, and then they investigate possible sources of 
divergence between these SWB measures and revealed preferences. In the present paper, however, the predictions as 
to how creative destruction should affect individuals’ utility turn out to be fully mirrored by the empirical analysis 
using SWB measures and data. 
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The final good is produced using a continuum of intermediate inputs, according 
to the logarithmic production function
  ln  Y t =  ∫ 
j∈ ln  y jt dj ,
where   ⊂  [0, 1] is the set of active product lines. We will denote its measure by 
J ∈  [0, 1] . The measure  J is invariant in steady state.
Each intermediate firm produces using one unit of labor according to the follow-
ing linear production function,
  y jt =  A jt  l jt , 
where  l jt = 1 is the labor employed by the firm, and is the same in all sectors. Thus 
the measure of inactive product lines is equal to the unemployment rate
  u t = 1 −  J t , 
where  u denotes the equilibrium unemployment rate. Our focus will be on balanced 
growth path equilibrium, therefore, when possible, we will drop time subscripts to 
save notation.
Innovation and Growth.—An innovator in sector  j at date  t will move productivity 
in sector  j from  A jt−1 to
  A jt = λ  A jt−1 , 
where  λ > 1. The innovator is a new entrant, and entry occurs in each sector with 
Poisson arrival rate  x which we assume to be exogenous . Upon entry in any sector, 
the previous incumbent firm becomes obsolete and its worker loses her job and the 
entering firm posts a new vacancy with an instantaneous cost  cY .6 Production in that 
sector resumes with the new technology when the firm has found a new suitable 
worker.
Labor Market and Job Matching.—Following Pissarides (1990), we let
(2)  m( u t ,  v t ) =  u t α  v t 1−α 
denote the arrival rate of new matches between firms and workers, where  u t denotes 
the number of unemployed at time  t and  v t denotes the number of vacancies. Thus 
the flow probability for each unemployed worker to find a suitable firm is
  m( u t ,  v t )/ u t , 
6 In online Appendix A1.7, we provide sufficient conditions under which the incumbent firm in any sector will 
choose to leave the market as soon as a new entrant shows up in that sector. The basic story is that, conditional 
upon a new entrant showing up, it becomes profitable for the incumbent firm to seek an alternative use of her assets. 
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whereas the probability for any new entrant firm to find a suitable new worker is
  m( u t ,  v t )/ v t . 
In steady state, there will be a constant fraction of product lines that are vacant (of 
measure  v ), and the remaining fraction will be producing. We illustrate this econ-
omy in Figure 1.
Finally, we assume that in each intermediate sector where a worker is currently 
employed, the worker appropriates fraction  β of profits whereas the complementary 
fraction  (1 − β) accrues to the employer.
Valuations and Life Satisfaction.—Life satisfaction is captured by the average 
present value of an individual employee, namely
  W t =  u t  U t + (1 −  u t ) E t , 
where  U t is the net present value of an individual who is currently unemployed, 
and  E t is the net present value of an individual who is currently employed.
The value of being currently employed satisfies the asset equation
  ρ  E t −  E ̇t =  w t + x( U t −  E t ). 
In words: the annuity value of being currently employed is equal to the capital 
gain  E ̇t plus the wage rate  w t at time  t and with arrival rate  x the worker becomes 
unemployed as the incumbent firm is being displaced by a new entrant. Here we 
already see the negative effect of turnover on currently employed workers.
Similarly, the value of being unemployed satisfies the asset equation
  ρ  U t −  U ̇ t =  b t + (m( u t ,  v t )/ u t )( E t −  U t ). 
Figure 1. Model Economy
Productivity level
Aj
0 1
Product line j
Producing lines, 1 − vVacant lines, v
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As before, the annuity value of being currently unemployed is equal to the capital 
gain  U ̇ t plus the benefit  b t accruing to an unemployed worker,7 and with arrival rate 
m( u t ,  v t )/ u t the unemployed worker escapes unemployment. For any given unem-
ployment rate, turnover has a positive effect on the value of being unemployed 
because it creates job opportunities.
B. Solving the Model
We now proceed to solve the model for equilibrium production and profits, the 
equilibrium steady-state unemployment rate, the steady-state growth rate, and the 
equilibrium value of life satisfaction.
Static Production Decision and Equilibrium Profits.—Let  w t denote the wage rate 
at date  t . The logarithmic technology for final good production implies that the final 
good producer spends the same amount  Y t on each variety  j. As a result, the final 
good production function generates a unit elastic demand with respect to each vari-
ety:  y jt =  Y t / p jt .
Note that the cost of production is simply  w jt which is the firm-specific wage rate . 
Then the profit is simply
(3)  π jt =  p jt  y jt −  w jt =  Y t −  w jt . 
Next, the above sharing rule between wage and profits implies that  w jt = β ( Y t −  w jt ) , hence
  w jt =  w t =  β ____ 1 + β  Y t ,  and   π jt =  1 ____ 1 + β  Y t = πY. 
Clearly,  β determines the allocation of income in the economy, with a higher  β 
shifting the income distribution toward workers.
Steady-State Equilibrium Unemployment.—Our focus is on a steady-state equi-
librium in which all aggregate variables ( Y t ,  w t ,  U t ,  E t ) grow at the same constant 
rate  g, and where the measure of unemployed  u and the number of vacancies and the 
interest rate remains constant over time.8 Henceforth, we will drop the time index  t , 
when it causes no confusion.
In steady state, the flow out of unemployment must equal the flow into unemploy-
ment. Namely:
(4)  m(u, v) = (1 − u)x. 
7 Think of this benefit term as being the sum of a (monetary) unemployment benefit and of a private utility (or 
disutility) of being currently unemployed. In online Appendix A1.6 we analyze the case where  b corresponds to 
unemployment benefits financed through taxing labor. There we show that the conclusion that “the negative impact 
of creative destruction on well-being is mitigated by the unemployment benefit,” continues to hold as long as the 
unemployment benefit is not financed completely by workers. 
8 In online Appendix A1.1, we discuss the transitional dynamics of this model. We show that following that 
increase in the entry rate convergence to the steady-state is fast. 
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The left-hand side is the flow out of unemployment, the right-hand side is the flow 
into unemployment, equal to the number of active sectors  (1 − u) times the turn-
over rate  x. 
In addition, the number of sectors without an employed worker is equal to the 
number of sectors with an open vacancy,  u = v. Combining this fact with the 
matching technology  (2) , we get
(5)  m = u = v. 
Putting equations  (4) and  (5) together, we obtain the equilibrium unemployment 
rate  u = (1 − u)x, or equivalently
(6)  u =  x ____ 
1 + x. 
That the numerator of  u is increasing in  x reflects the job destruction effect of turn-
over on currently employed workers; that the denominator is also increasing in  x 
reflects the positive effect a higher turnover rate has on the job finding rate of cur-
rently unemployed workers.
The first effect dominates here, with the equilibrium unemployment rate increas-
ing in the turnover rate  x. However this very much hinges on the fact that innova-
tive turnover is the only source of job destruction in this baseline model. In online 
Appendix A1.2, we introduce the possibility of exogenous job destruction on top 
of innovation-driven job destruction. Then we show that the higher the exogenous 
rate of job destruction, the more the innovation rate  x contributes to reducing unem-
ployment, and therefore the more positive the overall effect of  x on equilibrium 
well-being . 
Now we can express the growth rate of the economy.
LEMMA 1: The balanced growth path growth rate of the economy is equal to
  g = m ln λ, 
where  m denotes the flow of sectors in which a new innovation is being implemented 
(i.e., the rate at which new firm-worker matches occur).
PROOF:
See Appendix A.
Then, using the fact that in steady-state equilibrium we have  m = u =  x ___ 1 + x, 
we get the equilibrium growth rate as
(7)  g =  x ____ 
1 + x ln λ. 
As expected, the growth rate is increasing in the turnover rate  x and with the inno-
vation step size  λ .
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Equilibrium Valuations and Life Satisfaction.—Recall that life satisfaction is the 
average welfare of an individual employee, namely9
  W = uU + (1 − u)E, 
where
(8)  rE −  E ̇ = βπY + x(U − E ),  
and
 (9)  rU −  U ̇ = bY + (m(u, v)/u)(E − U ) .
Now, after substituting for  E and  U in the expression for the steady-state value of 
W, and using the fact that in steady state  E ̇ = gE and  U ̇ = gU, and that in equilib-
rium (see equation  (5) )  m = u  = x/(1 + x) , we get the following expression for 
life satisfaction:10
(10)  W =  Y ___ r − g[βπ −  xB ____ 1 + x]  ,
where
(11)  g =  x ____ 
1 + x ln λ and B ≡ βπ − b. 
From the above expression for  W, we see three effects of turnover on life satis-
faction. First, for given growth rate  g, more turnover increases the probability of 
an employed worker losing her current job (numerator in  xB ___ 1 + x) which reduces life 
satisfaction; second, for given growth rate  g, more turnover increases the probability 
of an unemployed worker finding a new job (denominator in  xB ___ 1 + x) which increases 
life satisfaction; third, higher turnover increases the growth rate  g which in turn acts 
favorably on life satisfaction: this is the capitalization effect mentioned in the intro-
duction. The overall effect of turnover on life satisfaction is ambiguous.11
Comparative Statics and Additional Discussions.—In this section, we discuss the 
implications of our model.
Unemployment versus Capitalization Effect: If we look at the effect of turn-
over on life satisfaction controlling for unemployment, this effect is unambiguously 
9 Note that in our analysis, life satisfaction is not necessarily equal to the present discounted value of income for 
at least two reasons. First, even though we labeled  b as the unemployment benefit, the interpretation of it is much 
more general and it can embody in reality the private disutility associated with being unemployed or opportunity 
cost of not working. Second, our results also hold for the case of risk aversion as we illustrate in online Appendix 
A1.3, in which case income and life satisfaction are distinct objects. 
10 See Appendix B for the detailed derivation of  (10) . 
11 Using the fact that  ∂ W ___∂ x =  
Y [βπ ln λ − Bρ]   _______________  [ (1 + x)  (ρ − ln λ) + ln λ] 2 , we see that  
∂ W ___∂ x > 0 if and only if  ρ <  βπ ln λ _____B . 
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positive. To see this, after some straightforward algebra we reexpress equilibrium 
well-being  W as
(12)  W =  Y ___ r − g [ub + (1 − u )βπ] ,
which for given  u is increasing in  x since it is increasing in  g and  g is increasing in 
x (capitalization effect).12
Taking the derivative of  (10) with respect to  x and substituting  (11) we get
  ∂ W ____∂ x =  
Y [βπ ln λ − Bρ] __________________    [ (1 + x)  (ρ − ln λ) + ln λ] 2 , 
which is clearly positive when  ρ <  βπ ln λ _____B , i.e., when the capitalization effect dom-
inates the negative unemployment effect. Note also that life satisfaction increases 
more with turnover  x the more generous unemployment benefits are13
   ∂ 2 W _____∂ x ∂ b > 0. 
We summarize the above discussion in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 1: (i) A higher turnover rate  x increases life satisfaction  W unam-
biguously once we control for the unemployment rate, not otherwise; (ii) life sat-
isfaction increases more with turnover  x the more generous unemployment benefits 
are.
Job Creation versus Job Destruction: So far, we have proxied job turnover using 
a single parameter  x. However, we can also write  (12) in terms of job creation and 
job destruction rates. Note that in our model, job creation happens through new 
matches, which happen at the rate  m  (= job_creation) and job destruction happens 
as incumbent firms are replaced by new entrants at the rate  x  (= job_destruction) . 
Hence we can express  (12) as
(13)  W =  Y  __________________   ρ − ln λ × job_creation[βπ − B  job_destruction  ________________ 1 + job_destruction] . 
Clearly, we obtain the following immediate comparative statics:
  ∂ W ____________ ∂ job_creation > 0,   ∂ W _______________ ∂ job_destruction < 0,  and    ∂ 
2 W  __________________ ∂ job_destruction  ∂b > 0. 
12 See Appendix C for the detailed derivation of equation (12). 
13 Indeed:
   ∂ 2 W ___∂ x ∂ b =  Yρ  ______________  [ (1 + x)  (ρ − ln λ) + ln λ] 2 > 0. 
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PROPOSITION 2: (i) A higher job creation rate increases, whereas a higher job 
destruction rate decreases life satisfaction  W ; (ii) life satisfaction decreases less 
with job destruction the more generous the unemployment benefits.
Current versus Future Well-Being and Transitional Dynamics: In this section, 
we discuss briefly the transitional dynamics and its impact on well-being. Consider 
a sudden unexpected increase in the rate of creative destruction from  x old to  x new 
such that  x new >  x old . This generates a transition from the old steady state to a new 
steady state. During this transition, the path of the growth rate is summarized in the 
following lemma.
LEMMA 2: Consider an initial steady state with a creative destruction rate of  x old . 
Assume that at time  t = 0, the creative destruction rate becomes  x new . Then the 
growth rate during the transition can be expressed as
(14)  g t =  g ss new −  e −t x new  [ g ss new −  g ss old ]  ,
where  g new and  g old are the new and old steady-state growth rates, respectively, 
and  g new >  g old .
PROOF: 
See online Appendix A1.1.
Let us denote the well-being at time  t under  x old and  x new by  W t old and  W t new , 
respectively. Moreover, let us denote their respective steady-state trajectories by  W t, ss old
and  W t, ss new . Expression  (14) makes it clear that when there is an increase in creative 
destruction from  x old to  x new >  x old , the growth rate will monotonically converge 
toward its new level. The impact of this change is illustrated in Figure 2. Before time 
0, i.e., at  t < 0 , well-being is increasing on its trajectory  W t, ss old. When the turnover 
rate increases from  x old to  x new when  t = 0, well-being accelerates and starts to 
evolve toward its new trajectory:  W t new →  W t, ss new . 
The important point to note here is that the gap between the new trajectory and 
the old trajectory widens over time. For instance, the gap between  W t new and  W t, ss old
at time  t =  T 1 is smaller than the gap at time  t =  T 2 . This implies that any change 
in the turnover rate has a bigger impact on the future well-being than the current 
well-being. Hence  Δ  W t ≡  W t new −  W t, ss old is increasing over time. In this economy, a 
given individual’s expected period- T future well-being from a time-zero perspective 
can be expressed as
  future_wellbeing (T ) =  e −ρT  W T . 
Clearly, an increase in turnover that increases future well-being will be perceived 
more highly by more patient individuals (with lower discount rate  ρ) . In online 
Appendix A1.1, we show that the transition in our model happens very fast. 
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Motivated by this fact, for any given well-being path  W t , if we approximate it with 
its steady-state value  W T ≈  W ss , we can also show this formally:
  ∂ future_wellbeing (T )   __________________ ∂ x ≈  e −ρT  ∂ W ss  _____∂ x > 0,  and
   ∂ 
2 future_wellbeing (T )  ___________________  ∂ x ∂ ρ ≈ −T  e −ρT  ∂ W ss  _____∂ x +  e −ρT   ∂ 
2  W ss  ______∂ x ∂ ρ < 0. 
In words, future well-being increases in creative destruction, and more so for 
more patient individuals. A nice feature of our well-being data is that individuals 
are asked about their expectation about their future well-being as well. This will 
allow us to directly test this prediction of our model using the “future well-being” 
measure.
Summary and Main Predictions.—In the empirical analysis below, we will use 
cross-MSA data on well-being and job turnover to test the following predictions 
from the model:
Prediction 1: A higher turnover rate increases well-being more when controlling 
for aggregate unemployment than when not controlling for aggregate unemployment.
Prediction 2: A higher job creation rate increases well-being, whereas a higher 
job destruction rate decreases well-being.
Prediction 3: A higher turnover rate increases well-being more, whereas a higher 
job destruction rate decreases well-being less the more generous the unemployment 
benefits.
Prediction 4: A higher turnover rate increases future well-being more for more 
forward-looking individuals.
Figure 2. Well-Being during Transition
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II. Empirical Analysis
A. Data
The data on creative destruction come from the BDS, which provide, at the met-
ropolitan level (MSA), information on job creation and destruction rates. The job 
creation (destruction) rate is the sum of all employment gains (losses) from expand-
ing (contracting) establishments from year  t − 1 to year  t including establishment 
creations (destructions), divided by the average employment between years  t and 
t − 1 . These rates are computed from the whole universe of firms as described in 
the Census Bureau's Longitudinal Business Database. Our main measure of creative 
destruction is the “job turnover rate,” defined as the sum of the job creation and job 
destruction rates. We also analyze the role of creation rates and destruction rates 
separately. For our panel analysis, we use an alternative data source, the LEHD 
constructed by the Census Bureau. This dataset varies at the quarterly level, whereas 
the BDS data vary only at the annual level. The LEHD dataset also allows for a 
sectoral breakdown, which we take advantage of to construct a predicted Bartik-like 
measure of turnover that we use as a robustness check. The job creation rate in the 
LEHD is defined as the estimated number of workers who start a new job in a given 
quarter divided by the average employment in that quarter. The job destruction rate 
is defined as the estimated number of workers whose job ended in a given quarter 
divided by the average employment in that quarter.
The main data source on SWB is the Gallup Healthways Well-Being Index, 
which collects data on 1,000 randomly selected Americans each day through phone 
interviews. The period covered is 2008–2011. Subjective well-being in Gallup is 
assessed through various questions aimed at capturing different dimensions of 
well-being. We focus on the “Cantril ladder of life” questions which are intended 
to measure the individual’s evaluation of her life. Each individual is asked: “Please 
imagine a ladder with steps numbered from 0 at the bottom to 10 at the top; The 
top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you and the bottom of the lad-
der represents the worst possible life for you; On which step of the ladder would 
you say you personally feel you stand at this time?”; and then “Which level of the 
ladder do you anticipate to achieve in five years?” We refer to answers to the first 
question as the “current ladder” and to the second one as the “future ladder.” The 
distinction between current and future ladder measures is particularly interesting, as 
we recall that some of the predictions, especially Prediction 4, rely mainly on future 
well-being.
To test the robustness of our main results to an alternative measure of well-being, 
we use the life satisfaction measure from the Behavioral Risk Factor and Surveillance 
System (BRFSS).14 The sample size is roughly similar to that of Gallup but the 
BRFSS does not distinguish between current and future well-being. Further details 
on these data are provided in the robustness section.
14 We prefer to use the life satisfaction measure from BRFSS rather than additional well-being measures from 
Gallup because the latter are destined to capture emotional well-being (as opposed to evaluative well-being), 
whereas the life satisfaction measure, as the Cantril ladder of life, seems better suited to capture our theoretical 
notion of welfare. 
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Additional data sources used are: the Local Area Unemployment Statistics from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the MSA-level unemployment rate; the FBI Crime 
Statistics for the MSA crime rates; the Bureau of Economic Analysis for population 
levels; and the Department of Labor for states’ unemployment insurance policies.
The descriptive statistics of our main data can be found in Table 1.
B. Estimation Framework
Our measure of creative destruction varies at the MSA level, thus we estimate 
MSA-level regressions. However, in order to take advantage of our micro-level data 
on SWB, we also perform individual-level regressions that allow us to have a richer 
and more meaningful set of controls. Individual characteristics such as marital sta-
tus do not vary much if we aggregate them at the MSA level, yet they are important 
determinants of well-being at the individual level. In all cases, regressions are OLS. 
We restrict the analysis to working age individuals (18–60 years old) to be closer to 
the model in which individuals are either employed or unemployed.15 , 16
15 However, we performed all the regressions for the whole population as well, which yields very similar results, 
though with slightly smaller coefficients. 
16 We cannot run separate regressions for the employed and the unemployed as we do not have access to consis-
tent measures of employment and unemployment either in Gallup or in the BRFSS. 
Table 1—Summary Statistics 
Observations Mean Standard deviation Min. Max.
MSA-level 2008–2011 averages (used in panel A of Tables 2, 3, and 4 ) 
Current ladder 363 6.724 0.192 6.059 7.431
Future ladder 363 7.950 0.195 7.363 8.571
Job turnover rate 363 0.261 0.036 0.165 0.409
Job creation rate 363 0.125 0.018 0.082 0.215
Job destruction rate 363 0.136 0.021 0.082 0.225
Unemployment rate 363 0.083 0.025 0.035 0.275
log of income 363 8.127 0.164 7.517 8.605
Share African Americans 363 0.102 0.102 0 0.454
Population (in thousands) 355 726.5 1,621 55.24 19,533
Crime rate(/100,000 inhab.) 352 401.4 176.9 65.33 1,085
Unemployment insurance generosity 363 1.759 0.520 0.624 2.931
Individual-level data, 2008–2011 (used in panel B of Tables 2, 3, and 4, and online Appendix Table A11 )
Current ladder 556,719 6.722 1.950 0 10
Future ladder 544,620 8.032 1.983 0 10
Female 556,719 0.491 0.500 0 1
Age 556,719 39.83 11.91 18 60
Black 556,719 0.126 0.332 0 1
Asian 556,719 0.026 0.158 0 1
White 556,719 0.725 0.447 0 1
Married or living with partner 556,719 0.592 0.492 0 1
Average years of schooling 556,719 14.18 2.346 10 18
Monthly household income 556,719 5,709 5,033 347.1 16,483
log income 556,719 8.234 0.984 5.850 9.710
Quarterly panel data (used in panel C of Tables 2 and 3)
Job turnover rate 5,704 0.326 0.093 0.141 1.815
Job creation rate 5,704 0.146 0.045 0.053 0.894
Job destruction rate 5,704 0.180 0.053 0.080 0.929
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At the MSA level, we look at purely cross-sectional regressions, where we aver-
age our SWB data at the MSA level and across our sample years.17 In all specifica-
tions we control for MSA-level averages of the Gallup respondents’ income. Income 
is measured in terms of household income brackets. We calculate the midpoints 
of these brackets assuming that income is log-normally distributed and we then 
average at the MSA level these log midpoints.18 In our regressions, we also explore 
what happens when we add MSA-level potential confounders such as crime rate, the 
share of African Americans, and population.
At the individual level, we perform regressions where we control for individual 
characteristics such as education, income, and ethnicity, as well as gender, marital 
status, and age. Our specification is as follows:
(15)  SW B i, m, t = α ×  X m, t + β ×  Y m, t + δ ×  Z i, t +  T t +  ϵ i, t , 
where  SW B m, t is SWB for individual  i who lives in MSA  m in year  t . This measure is 
derived through the current ladder question or the future ladder question in the Gallup 
survey. The variable  X m, t is either the job turnover rate and the unemployment rate 
in MSA  m in year  t (Prediction 1), or the job creation and the job destruction rates 
introduced separately (Prediction 2). Values of  Y m, t are MSA-level controls, such as 
the population level in year  t , the crime rate, and the share of African Americans. 
Values of  Z i, t are individual-level controls: gender, age, age squared, four race dum-
mies, six education dummies, six family status dummies, and nine dummies for 
income brackets. Values of  T t are year and month fixed effects. Finally,  ϵ m, t is the 
error term. A constant is also included and standard errors are clustered at the MSA 
level. When testing Prediction 3, we interact our creative destruction proxies with 
a measure of the generosity of the state’s unemployment insurance. When testing 
Prediction 4 in the online Appendix, we interact the job creation and the job destruc-
tion rates with proxies for the individual discount rate (age, education, and income). 
Robustness checks are discussed below in Section IIIB.
C. Testing Prediction 1
In this section, we test Prediction 1: A higher turnover rate increases well-being 
more when controlling for aggregate unemployment than when not controlling for 
aggregate unemployment.
Recall that the model highlights two opposite forces whereby creative destruction 
impacts SWB: the negative effect that comes from the higher risk of unemployment 
through job destruction and the positive growth effect through new job creation. 
Controlling for the unemployment rate should capture part of the negative force of 
creative destruction and thus lead to a more positive coefficient of creative destruc-
tion on well-being than without the control for unemployment.
17 Sample years are 2008–2011 for the main analysis using Gallup data, and 2005–2010 when using the BRFSS 
data in the online Appendix, which we then also decompose into 2005–2007 and 2008–2010. 
18 We also checked that our results are unchanged when using the log of MSA-level income per capita as mea-
sured by the Bureau of Economic Analysis and averaged over the relevant period. 
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MSA-Level Results.—Before displaying the regression results, we show two scat-
ter plots where one observation corresponds to an MSA. Figure 3 plots the MSA’s 
average life satisfaction on MSA-level job turnover, where circle sizes are propor-
tional to MSA population levels. We then regress these MSA-level life satisfaction 
and job turnover variables on the MSA’s unemployment rate and plot the residuals 
in Figure 4. We see that well-being is more strongly positively associated with job 
turnover, once we control for the unemployment rate.
Figure 3. Simple Scatter Plot
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Figure 4. Residual Scatter Plot
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Now moving to the regression results, Table 2, panel A, shows the results from 
baseline OLS regressions at the MSA level. We see that job turnover has a positive 
but statistically insignificant effect on current well-being. Column 2 shows that once 
we control for unemployment, job turnover has an effect on well-being that is more 
than twice as large and strongly statistically significant. This is in line with our model 
which predicts that, controlling for unemployment, turnover should have a more 
positive effect on well-being as it implies higher growth and a higher  probability 
for currently unemployed workers of finding a new job.19 In column 3, we add addi-
tional MSA controls: population, crime rate, and share of African Americans.20 We 
see that these potential confounders do not significantly affect the coefficients of the 
creative destruction variable.
The difference between the estimates on creative destruction in column 1 ver-
sus 2 and 3 is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The last row in each 
panel of Table 2 reports the p-value associated with a Wald test of the hypothesis 
that  α CD;column1 =  α CD;column2 .
Column 4 repeats the same specification as column 3 but with future well-being 
as the dependent variable. We first see that job turnover has a stronger effect on the 
future ladder than on the current Cantril ladder. This in turn points to the notion that 
individuals disentangle the short-run losses from becoming unemployed as a result 
of job turnover from the long-term gains associated with higher growth and more 
new job opportunities in the future.
The magnitude of the effect of creative destruction on current life satisfaction is 
in the same ballpark as that of the effect of the unemployment rate. In particular, 
moving from an MSA which is at the twenty-fifth percentile in terms of its level of 
creative destruction (i.e., with a job creation rate + destruction rate at 23.5 percent) 
to an MSA at the seventy-fifth percentile (i.e., with a job creation rate plus job 
destruction rate at 28.3 percent) is associated with an increase in the current ladder 
of life of 0.06 points (column 2 in Table 2, panel A). As a benchmark, looking at the 
same regression, moving from the seventy-fifth to the  twenty-fifth percentile in terms 
of the unemployment rate (that is, from a 9.4 percent to a 6.7 percent unemploy-
ment rate) is associated with an increase in life satisfaction of 0.07 points. Another 
way to put it is that a one standard deviation increase in job turnover increases 
the current ladder by 0.25 standard deviation: that effect is equivalent to a 0.7 (= (0.036 × 1.288/2.727)/ 0.025) standard deviation decrease in the  MSA-level 
unemployment rate.
Individual-Level Results.—In Table 2, panel B, we perform individual-level 
regressions and find qualitatively similar results as in panel A. The difference is that 
we now also control for individual-level characteristics and for year and month fixed 
effects. We thus control for household income brackets and we keep the control 
for the MSA-level log of income. Note that the MSA-level income has a negative 
impact on well-being once we control for individual-level income, which suggests 
19 The correlation between the MSA-level average job turnover rates over the period 2008–2011 and the 
 MSA-level average unemployment rates over the same period, is equal to 0.344. 
20 The share of African Americans is a weighted average of the number of respondents in the surveys that report 
being black in the race question. Weights used to compute the weighted average are those attached to the respondent 
by Gallup. 
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Table 2—Test of Prediction 1
Current ladder Future ladder
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. MSA-level analysis
Job turnover rate 0.599 1.288 1.322 1.726
(0.361) (0.410) (0.424) (0.306)
Unemployment rate −2.727 −2.581 −0.930
(0.786) (0.823) (0.507)
log of income 0.342 0.195 0.225 0.297
(0.0839) (0.088) (0.106) (0.079)
Additional MSA controls x x
Observations 363 363 344 344
R2 0.100 0.198 0.217 0.459
p-value job turnover [1] = job turnover [2] 0.000
Panel B. Individual-level analysis
Job turnover rate 0.0676 0.521 0.611 0.984
(0.236) (0.237) (0.285) (0.148)
Unemployment rate −2.299 −2.168 −0.0857
(0.443) (0.502) (0.298)
MSA-level log of income −0.187 −0.285 −0.263 −0.0424
(0.048) (0.046) (0.051) (0.038)
Additional MSA controls x x
Individual controls (incl. income) x x x x
Year and month fixed effects x x x x
Observations 556,300 556,300 461,054 450,908
R2 0.103 0.104 0.103 0.095
p-value job turnover [1] = job turnover [2] 0.000
Panel C. Panel analysis
Job turnover rate 0.678 0.787 0.249 0.234
(0.0970) (0.105) (0.142) (0.140)
Unemployment rate −2.238 −1.743 −1.074
(0.301) (1.054) (1.057)
log of income 0.410 0.360 0.412 0.192
(0.0301) (0.0307) (0.0373) (0.0390)
MSA fixed effects x x
Additional MSA controls x x x x
Year and quarter fixed effects x x x x
Observations 4,884 4,884 4,884 4,884
R2 0.189 0.203 0.325 0.256
p-value job turnover [1] = job turnover [2] 0.041
Notes: The dependent variables are SWB measures from Gallup: columns 1 through 3 use the current Cantril lad-
der of life whereas column 4 uses the future ladder of life. Sample years are 2008–2011 and the sample is restricted 
to working-age respondents. Column 1 regresses SWB on the job turnover rate, which comes in panels A and B, 
from the BDS, and in panel C, from the LEHD which provide data at the quarterly level. Column 2 adds a control 
for the MSA-level unemployment rate. Columns 3 and 4 further add some MSA-level controls: population (in lev-
els), crime rates, and share of African Americans. All specifications control for income at the MSA-level. All data 
sources and variable definitions are in the main text. Panel A carries a cross-sectional analysis at the MSA-level, 
where the variables are averaged across years within each MSA. The SWB measures are averaged using the weights 
attached by Gallup to each respondent. Panel B carries a repeated cross-section analysis at the  individual-level. 
Month and Year fixed effects are added to the specification as well as individual controls: age, age squared, a 
dummy for being female, six dummies for family status, six dummies for education, and four race dummies (black, 
Asian, white, other, or missing), as well as nine dummies for household income brackets. Regressions are weighted 
by individual weights attached by Gallup to each respondent. Panel C shows the results of a quarterly panel analysis 
at the MSA-level. The SWB measures are averaged at the MSA-quarter level using the weights attached by Gallup 
to each respondent. All regressions include year and quarter fixed effects, quarterly controls for the MSA’s average 
log of income, and the share of African Americans in the MSA, as well as annual controls for population levels and 
crime rates. Columns 3 and 4 add MSA fixed effects.
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that well-being depends on relative income of an individual. The creative destruc-
tion variable now varies at the MSA-year level.
We can still reject at the 1 percent level that the coefficient of job turnover on 
well-being is the same whether or not we control for the unemployment rate. We 
also see that the effect of turnover is stronger on the future ladder than on the current 
ladder.
The magnitude of the creative destruction effect is smaller than that displayed at 
the MSA level. A one standard deviation increase in job turnover has an effect on the 
current ladder of life which is equivalent to a 0.3 standard deviation increase in the 
MSA-level unemployment rate  (= (0.036 × 0.521/2.299)/0.025) .
Panel Results.—In panel C, we show results from quarterly panel regressions 
with year and quarter fixed effects, with and without MSA fixed effects. However, 
we want to stress why we have a preference for the cross-sectional analysis. The 
theoretical concept of creative destruction is being proxied in our empirical analysis 
by a job turnover variable. So we are proxying  x(t) by  x ∗ (t) which is equal to  x(t) 
plus some measurement (or proxy) error  ϵ(t) . Adding MSA fixed effects into the 
regression changes in an unfavorable way the relative variances of the signal, the 
variance of  x(t) , and the noise, the variance of  ϵ(t) . If the job destruction variable 
changes only slowly over time within each MSA, which is the case here, looking at 
the deviation of job destruction from its MSA time-mean is going to be problematic, 
as more of that deviation is going to come from the proxy error, not from the vari-
able itself. Hence our predictions are better captured by cross-sectional regressions 
than by panel regressions that cover such short time periods.
Because our sample period is very short, we use a quarterly frequency to look at 
panel specifications. Thus we use the LEHD dataset constructed by the Census Bureau, 
based on the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages and other administrative 
and survey data. Indeed, these data contain information on employment, earnings, and 
job flows at the MSA and quarterly level. In terms of creative destruction: rather than 
job creations and destructions, the data give us the number of hires and separations. To 
compute the turnover rates, we divide these hires or separations by the average stock 
of employment in that quarter. The results are reported in Table 2, panel C.
If we compare column 1 to column 2, we see again that the coefficient for job turn-
over is higher when we control for the MSA-level unemployment rate than when we 
do not. The difference is significant at the 5 percent level. These two columns are with-
out MSA fixed effects. When we add MSA fixed effects (column 3), the coefficient of 
job turnover is still significantly positive at the ten percent level, although of a smaller 
magnitude. Note that all the specifications in panel C control for time-varying poten-
tial  MSA-level controls: population levels, crime rates, share of African Americans.
D. Testing Prediction 2
In this section, we test Prediction 2: A higher job creation rate increases well-be-
ing, whereas a higher job destruction rate decreases well-being.
MSA-Level Results.—Table 3, panel A, shows the results from the baseline OLS 
regressions at the MSA level. The first two columns use current ladder whereas 
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Table 3—Test of Prediction 2
Current ladder Future ladder
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. MSA-level analysis
Job creation rate 5.486 5.567 3.588 3.103
(0.978) (1.015) (0.825) (0.682)
Job destruction rate −3.586 −3.433 −0.158 0.144
(0.838) (0.870) (0.702) (0.668)
log of income 0.277 0.293 0.221 0.324
(0.077) (0.094) (0.061) (0.073)
Additional MSA controls x x
Observations 363 344 363 344
R2 0.218 0.246 0.149 0.460
Panel B. Individual-level analysis
Job creation rate 1.098 1.274 1.068 0.944
(0.395) (0.445) (0.206) (0.220)
Job destruction rate −0.791 −0.702 0.926 0.987
(0.274) (0.306) (0.197) (0.225)
MSA log of income −0.197 −0.173 −0.0408 −0.0382
(0.046) (0.048) (0.031) (0.038)
Additional MSA controls x x
Individual controls (incl. income) x x x x
Year and month fixed effects x x x x
Observations 556,300 461,054 544,228 450,908
R2 0.103 0.103 0.094 0.095
Panel C. Panel analysis
Job creation rate 2.276 1.213 1.690 1.155
(0.316) (0.357) (0.293) (0.349)
Job destruction rate −0.617 −0.466 −0.647 −0.460
(0.274) (0.314) (0.249) (0.285)
log of income 0.416 0.416 0.266 0.195
(0.0299) (0.0371) (0.0304) (0.0389)
MSA fixed effects x x
Additional MSA controls x x x x
Year and quarter fixed effects x x x x
Observations 4,884 4,884 4,884 4,884
R2 0.195 0.325 0.145 0.257
Notes: The dependent variables are SWB measures from Gallup: columns 1 and 2 use the current Cantril ladder of 
life whereas columns 3 and 4 use the future ladder of life. Sample years are 2008–2011 and the sample is restricted 
to working-age respondents. Columns 1 and 3 regress these life satisfaction measures on the job creation and the 
job destruction rates, which come, in panel A and B, from the BDS, and in panel C, from the LEHD which provide 
data at the quarterly level. All specifications control for income at the MSA-level. Columns 2 and 4 add some MSA-
level controls: the unemployment rate, population (in levels), crime rates, and share of African Americans. All data 
sources and variables definitions are in the main text. Panel A carries a cross-sectional analysis at the MSA-level, 
where the variables are averaged across years within each MSA. The SWB measures are averaged using the weights 
attached by Gallup to each respondent. Panel B carries a repeated cross-section analysis at the individual-level. 
Month and Year fixed effects are added to the specification as well as individual controls: age, age squared, a 
dummy for being female, six dummies for family status, six dummies for education, and four race dummies (black, 
Asian, white, other, or missing), as well as nine dummies for household income brackets. Regressions are weighted 
by individual weights attached by Gallup to each respondent. Panel C shows the results of a quarterly panel analysis 
at the MSA level. The SWB measures are averaged at the MSA-quarter level using the weights attached by Gallup 
to each respondent. All regressions include year and quarter fixed effects, quarterly controls for the MSA’s average 
log of income, and the share of African Americans in the MSA, as well as annual controls for population levels and 
crime rates. Columns 2 and 4 add MSA fixed effects.
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the last two columns use the future ladder as dependent variables. In the first and 
third columns, we see the positive effect of job creation and the negative effect 
of job destruction on current and future well-being which are very much in line 
with Prediction 2. Columns 2 and 4 introduce additional MSA-level confounders: 
the MSA’s average population level over the period, its average crime rate and its 
average share of African Americans. These controls do not change the pattern: over-
all, job creation and destruction have opposite effects on well-being, as the theory 
predicted.
Now, consider the magnitudes of the various effects. A one standard deviation 
increase in the job creation rate is associated with an increase in the current ladder of 
life of slightly more than half a standard deviation  (= 0.018 × 5.567/0.192) . A one 
standard deviation increase in the job destruction rate is associated with a decrease 
in the current ladder of life of 0.4  (= 0.021 × 3.433/0.192) standard deviations.
Individual-Level Results.—In Table 3, panel B, we perform individual-level regres-
sions and find qualitatively similar results as in panel A. Again, we control for many 
demographic characteristics as well as income brackets. All specifications include 
year and month fixed effects as well as a control for the MSA’s log of income. The job 
creation and destruction rates vary at the MSA-year level. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the MSA level. Again, columns 2 and 4 are similar to columns 1 and 3 except 
that additional MSA-level potential confounders are added. We see that these addi-
tional controls barely change the coefficient on the job creation and destruction rates. 
Similar to Prediction 1, the magnitudes are smaller than for the MSA-level results.
Panel Results.—In panel C, we show results of panel specifications using quar-
terly data on job creation and destruction rates coming from the LEHD, as in 
panel C of Table 2. Columns 1 and 3 are without MSA fixed effects, whereas col-
umns 2 and 4 are with MSA fixed effects. All specifications include year and quarter 
fixed effects as well as MSA-level potential confounders such as share of African 
Americans, population level, and crime rate. Prediction 2 remains verified in panel 
analysis, with a positive effect of the job creation rate on SWB and a negative effect 
of the job destruction rate.
E. Testing Prediction 3
In this section, we test Prediction 3: A higher turnover rate increases well-being 
more, whereas a higher job destruction rate decreases well-being less, the more 
generous the unemployment benefits.
The generosity of unemployment insurance (UI) varies at the state level. To avoid 
the endogeneity of the total number of benefits claimed, we use, as is standard in 
the literature, the maximum weekly benefit amount as a measure of the state’s UI 
generosity. We normalize it by the average taxable wage. Our results are robust to 
whether or not we do this normalization. Panel A of Table 4 carries the analysis 
at the  MSA-level whereas panel B shows the results when using individual level 
regressions, controlling for the same individual characteristics used in panel B of 
Tables 2 and 3. The coefficients of interest are that of the interaction term between 
job turnover and UI generosity, as well as that of the interaction term between job 
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destruction and UI generosity. Indeed we expect the effect of UI generosity to alle-
viate the negative effect of the job destruction rate by making the risk of unemploy-
ment less costly. On the contrary, there is no clear prediction on how UI generosity 
should interact with the job creation rate. Thus we do not report the interaction terms 
and main effect of the job creation rate although these variables are included in all 
the specifications that feature the job destruction rate (i.e., columns 3 and 4). Note 
that we demean our measure of the state’s UI generosity such that the coefficients 
for the main effect of the job turnover or the job destruction rate show the effect for 
MSAs located in a state where the UI generosity is at its mean value.
MSA-Level Results.—We see that the effect of the job turnover rate on SWB at 
the mean value of UI generosity is positive and that the coefficient of the interaction 
Table 4—Test of Prediction 3
Current ladder
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. MSA-level analysis
Job turnover rate 0.524 0.662
(0.362) (0.378)
Job turnover  × UI generosity 0.989 0.897
(0.422) (0.416)
Job destruction rate −3.661 −3.536
(0.789) (0.816)
Job destruction  × UI generosity 2.357 2.369
(1.105) (1.113)
UI generosity −0.288 −0.253 −0.167 −0.137
(0.114) (0.113) (0.128) (0.128)
Additional MSA controls x x
Observations 363 344 363 344
R2 0.116 0.136 0.237 0.262
Panel B. Individual-level analysis
Job turnover rate 0.0845 0.209
(0.230) (0.262)
Job turnover  × UI generosity 0.675 0.670
(0.310) (0.357)
Job destruction rate −0.794 −0.720
(0.272) (0.300)
Job destruction  × UI generosity 0.620 0.673
(0.329) (0.372)
UI generosity −0.198 −0.183 −0.212 −0.200
(0.085) (0.096) (0.083) (0.094)
Individual controls (incl. income) x x x x
Year and month fixed effects x x x x
Additional MSA controls x x
Observations 556,300 461,054 556,300 461,054
R2 0.103 0.103 0.104 0.103
Notes: Panel A carries a cross-sectional analysis at the MSA-level, where the variables are averaged across years 
within each MSA, whereas panel B carries a repeated cross-section analysis at the individual-level. The first two 
columns are similar to the columns 1 and 3 of Table 2, and the last two columns are similar to the first two col-
umns of Table 3, except that the creative destruction variables ( job turnover, job creation, and destruction rates) 
are interacted with state-level UI generosity. UI generosity is measured by the average maximum weekly benefit 
amount over the period 2008–2011 normalized by the average taxable wage in covered employment. The variable is 
demeaned. We don’t report the interaction coefficient for job creation as the interaction of interest is the job destruc-
tion one (see main text). 
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term between job turnover and the generosity of UI is significantly positive and 
economically significant (column 1, Table 4, panel A). A one standard deviation 
increase in UI generosity increases the positive effect of job turnover by almost 100 
percent  (= 0.520 × 0.989/0.524) . This remains true in column 2 when we control 
for the same potential MSA-level confounders as in Table 2 and 3.
This more positive effect of turnover on SWB in MSA located in states with more 
generous UI is driven by a much less negative effect of the job destruction rate. 
Indeed we see in column 3 that the direct effect of job destruction on well-being is 
negative but the interaction term between the job destruction rate and the generosity 
of UI is significantly positive. A one standard deviation increase in our measure of 
UI generosity reduces the negative effect of the job destruction rate by 33 percent 
( = 0.52 × 2.357/3.661 ). Thus the effect of UI generosity is not only statistically 
significant but also economically so.
Individual-Level Results.—The individual-level results of panel B shows the 
exact same pattern as the MSA-level results of panel A. We still have a significantly 
positive coefficient for the interaction terms of both job turnover and UI generosity 
(columns 1 and 2) as well as job destruction and UI generosity (columns 3 and 4). 
Results are barely affected by the addition of potential MSA-level confounders. 
And the magnitude of the interaction effect is roughly similar to that displayed at 
the MSA-level: For instance in column 3, a one standard deviation increase in our 
measure of UI generosity reduces the negative effect of the job destruction rate by 
40 percent ( = 0.52 × 0.62/0.794) .
F. Testing Prediction 4
In the online Appendix A2.1, we test Prediction 4: A higher turnover rate 
increases future well-being more for more forward-looking individuals.
It is hard to find a direct measure of the discount rate. The literature on this sub-
ject found that old individuals, educated individuals, and rich individuals tend to be 
more patient (Gilman 1976, Black 1983, Lawrance 1991, Warner and Pleeter 2001). 
In the online Appendix (Table A11) we use age, education, and income to proxy 
for individuals with different patience levels. This exercise should be seen as a first 
step, as our data does not provide a measure of patience which is fully convincing on 
its own. Further tests of this prediction are left to future work to be conducted with 
better measures of patience.
III. Robustness Checks and Extensions
In this section, we discuss various theoretical and empirical robustness checks 
and extensions.
A. Theory
Transitional Dynamics.—In online Appendix A1.1, we consider the transitional 
dynamics. More specifically, we look at the dynamic impact of a sudden increase in 
the entry rate. In particular we show that: (i) following such an increase in the entry 
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rate convergence to the steady-state is fast; (ii) the big change in welfare occurs 
at the time of the increase in entry rate; and (iii) the comparative statics on this 
change are quite similar to the comparative statics on steady-state welfare stated in 
Proposition 1. Thus there is no loss of insight in restricting attention to the steady 
state in our analysis in general.
Exogenous Job Destruction.—In the current model, the creative destruction rate 
x generates both job destruction for the workers in incumbent firms and job creation 
for currently unemployed workers. When job destruction is fully endogenous, as it 
currently is, the former effect dominates and the equilibrium unemployment rate  u (x) increases in  x as in  (6) . In online Appendix A1.2, we extend the model so as to 
also allow for exogenous job destruction. There we show that the higher the exoge-
nous rate of job destruction, the more the innovation rate  x will contribute to reduc-
ing unemployment (the latter effect dominates), and therefore the more positive the 
overall effect of  x on equilibrium well-being.
Risk Aversion.—Our theoretical analysis can be straightforwardly extended 
to the case where individuals are risk averse. In online Appendix A1.3 we show 
that when agents are risk averse, job loss is perceived more detrimentally than 
when they are risk neutral. Consequently, there is a range of unemployment ben-
efits for which higher turnover reduces life satisfaction for risk-averse individu-
als with log preferences whereas it would increase life satisfaction for risk-neutral 
individuals.
Endogenous Entry.—In online Appendix A1.4, we extend the model to endoge-
nize entry. This in turn enriches our analysis of the relationship between well-being 
and the determinants of creative destruction. In particular, a lower entry cost will 
have the same effects on well-being as the effects of an increase in  x, but an increase 
in the size of innovations will enhance both the growth effect for given  x and the 
creative destruction effect (it will foster  x ).
Matching Efficiency.—In online Appendix A1.5, we generalize the model by 
introducing a multiplicative parameter which reflects the efficiency of the matching 
process. This allows us to look at what happens when the costs of unemployment 
are incurred over longer expected time periods. We find that as the cost of unem-
ployment has a longer impact (the productivity of matching declines), the negative 
impact of innovation on well-being through unemployment is amplified.
Taxing Labor to Finance UI Benefits.—In online Appendix A1.6, we consider a 
generalized version of our setting where the unemployment benefit is financed by 
raising taxes on labor income and corporate profits. We show that our results on 
unemployment benefit are robust to this generalization.
B. Empirics
We perform several robustness checks to confirm the validity of our empirical 
results on the main predictions. More details are provided in the online Appendix.
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BRFSS Data.—First we look at what happens when we use an alternative mea-
sure of SWB. Online Appendix Tables A2 and A3 use the life satisfaction measure 
from the BRFSS. In BRFSS, life satisfaction is measured using the question: “In 
general how satisfied are you with your life?” The possible answers are: “Very sat-
isfied,” “Satisfied,” “Dissatisfied,” and “Very dissatisfied.” We recode these answers 
so that “Very dissatisfied” corresponds to grade 1 and “Very satisfied” to grade 4.
Online Appendix Table A2 tests for Prediction 1 and shows that, even when using 
the BRFSS measure of SWB, the effect of MSA job turnover on well-being is more 
positive when we control for the unemployment rate than when we do not. The 
difference is  statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Online Appendix Table 
A3 tests for Prediction 2 and confirms a significant positive effect of job creation 
on life satisfaction and a negative effect of job destruction, also with this alternative 
measure of our left-hand-side variable.
Effect of the 2008 Crisis.—In the BRFSS, the life satisfaction measure starts in 
2005 instead of 2008 for the Gallup variables. Thus BRFSS allows us to check that 
our results are robust to restricting attention to different subperiods. In particular, 
to deal with the concern that the period post 2008 is a period following a major 
recession, where all kinds of other things were going on in developed economies, in 
online Appendix Tables A4 and A5 we decompose the overall BRFSS sample period 
into the subperiods 2005–2007 and 2008–2010. Online Appendix Table A4 tests for 
Prediction 1 and online Appendix Table A5 tests for Prediction 2.
In online Appendix Table A4 we find that the effect of turnover on life satisfaction 
is less positive during the crisis years than in the period before, but this difference 
disappears when controlling for unemployment. In online Appendix Table A5 we 
find that job creation (resp. job destruction) has a more positive (resp. negative) 
effect on well-being before the crises years.
Alternative Definition of Creative Destruction.—We then look at what happens 
when we use an alternative measure of creative destruction. In online Appendix 
Tables A6 and A7 we use the measure that comes from the LEHD, which we also use 
in our main panel analysis because of its quarterly nature. Online Appendix Table 
A6 reproduces the baseline MSA cross-sectional specification of Table 2, panel A 
(testing for Prediction 1) but using this LEHD measure of job turnover, whereas 
online Appendix Table A7 reproduces the baseline MSA cross-sectional specifica-
tion of Table 3, panel A (testing for Prediction 2) but using the LEHD measures 
of job creation and job destruction. We see that both Predictions 1 and 2 are still 
verified in cross-section when we use these other measures of creative destruction. 
Indeed the effect of job turnover as measured by the LEHD on the current ladder of 
life is more positive when we control for the unemployment rate than when we do 
not and the difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The effect on 
well-being of the job creation rate as measured by LEHD is significantly positive 
and that of the destruction rate is significantly negative.
Nonlinearity of Unemployment.—In online Appendix Table A8, we show that 
Prediction 1 is robust to controlling nonlinearly for the unemployment rate. Indeed 
we introduce a cubic polynomial of the unemployment rate instead of just the 
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 unemployment rate to the baseline specification of panel A of Table 2. We still have 
that the effect of job  turnover in column 2, i.e., when controlling for the unem-
ployment rate, here nonlinearly, is statistically different at the 1 percent level from 
the effect of job turnover in column 1, when we do not control for unemployment. 
Since the unemployment rate does not play any role in Prediction 2, we only test the 
robustness to nonlinear control for the unemployment rate for Prediction 1.
Bartik Analysis.—The last and important robustness check we perform, in 
Tables A9 and A10, aims at alleviating a potential endogeneity concern. Indeed, to 
abstract from the effects of local changes in industry composition, or from the effects 
of purely local shocks that could get mixed up with variations in local turnover, we 
construct a “predicted measure” (or Bartik-type measure) of creative destruction as 
follows:
  ˆ  CDm, t =  ∑ 
j
  ω j, m, 2004 × C D j, m, USA, t .
For each MSA  m in quarter-year  t: (i) the predicted level of creative destruc-
tion,  ˆ  CDm, t , is computed by taking a weighted average of countrywide sectoral turn-
over measures in quarter-year  t; (ii)  C D j, m, USA, t is the country-wide average creative 
destruction in sector  j leaving out MSA  m; and (iii) the weights  ω j, m, 2004 are deter-
mined by the sectoral structure in the MSA in 2004 (sectors are two-digit NAICS).
Thus, we reproduce the MSA-level quarterly panel regressions of panel C 
in Tables 2 and 3 but replacing the direct local turnover variable by its predicted 
value  ˆ  CDm, t . Standard errors are still clustered at the MSA level.21 The results turn 
out to be quite similar when using the predicted measure of turnover instead of 
the actual quarterly turnover rate as the right-hand side variable. In particular, for 
Prediction 1, the coefficient for job turnover is larger when we control for unem-
ployment than when we do not and the difference is significant at the 1 percent level. 
The coefficient remains positive and significant when we add MSA fixed-effects. 
Interestingly the MSA fixed-effects do not make the coefficient decrease as much 
as when using the actual turnover rate as the main right-hand-side variable. Online 
Appendix Table A10 shows that the effect of job creation and job destruction, when 
captured by these predicted measures, are still significantly positive and negative, 
respectively.
IV. Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed the relationship between turnover-driven 
growth and SWB, using cross-sectional MSA level US data. We have first built a 
Schumpeterian model of growth and unemployment to make predictions on how job 
and firm turnover affect well-being under various circumstances. Our main empirical 
findings are consistent with the theory: namely: (i) the effect of creative destruction 
21 If we assume that the sectoral composition in an MSA in 2004 has no direct effect on SWB in that same MSA 
in 2008–2011, we could use our predicted measure of creative destruction as an instrument to try and get at whether 
the effect of creative destruction on SWB is causal. 
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on well-being is unambiguously positive if we control for unemployment, less so if 
we do not; (ii) job creation has a positive and job destruction has a negative impact 
on well-being; (iii) job destruction has a less negative impact in MSA within states 
with more generous unemployment insurance policies; and (iv) job creation has 
a more positive effect on individuals that are more forward-looking. We see these 
findings not just as a test of the Schumpeterian theory of growth, creative destruc-
tion, and unemployment, but also of the usefulness of current and future well-being 
measures.
This is the first step of a broader research project on innovation-led growth and 
well-being. A first avenue forward could be to use a similar combination of the 
theory and of cross-section analysis to investigate other potential determinants of 
well-being and compare them with the determinants of (per capita) GDP growth. 
A second extension would be to look at how the relationship between turnover 
and well-being is affected by individual characteristics and by characteristics of 
labor markets and labor market policy (e.g., training systems and availability of 
vocational education). A third extension would be to look for policy shocks (e.g., 
labor market reforms) that may affect the relationship between creative destruction 
and well-being. These and other extensions of the analysis in this paper are left for 
future research.
Appendix
A. Proof of Lemma 1
The output in this economy is
  ln  Y t =  ∫ 
j∈ ln  A jt  dj ≡  (1 − u) ln  A –t .
Then after a small time interval  Δt: 
  ln  Y t+Δt =  ∫  [xΔt × 0 +  (1 − xΔt) ln  A jt ] dj 
 +  ∫  ′ [ m __v Δt ln (1 + λ)  A –t +  (1 −  m __v Δt) × 0] dj
 =  (1 − xΔt)  (1 − u) ln  A –t + u  m __v Δt ln (1 + λ)  A –t 
 =  [1 − u] ln  A –t + mΔt ln (1 + λ) .
Hence we can find the growth rate as
  g =  lim Δt→0 
   ln  Y t+Δt − ln  Y t   ___________Δt = m ln (1 + λ) . ∎
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B. Derivation of Equation (10)
Note that using the fact that in steady state  E ̇ = gE and  U ̇ = gU, and after sub-
tracting the second equation from the first:
  (r − g)(E − U ) = BY + (1 + x)(U − E ), 
where  B ≡ βπ − b. 
This yields
  E − U =  BY _______  
r − g + 1 + x. 
Then, substituting for  (E − U ) in the above asset equations  (8) and  (9) , yields
  U =  [bY +  BY _______  r − g + 1 + x]  1 ___ r − g ;  and E =  [βπY −  xBY _______  r − g + 1 + x]  1 ___ r − g, 
so that, after substituting for  E and  U in the expression for  W, and using the fact that 
in equilibrium  u = x/(1 + x) , we get
  W =  Y ___ r − g[βπ −  xB ____ 1 + x] . 
C. Derivation of Equation (12)
Recall that 
  W = uU + (1 − u)E, 
where  E and  U are expressed in  (8) and  (9) . Now, using the fact that 
m(u, v)/u = (1 − u)x/u and that in steady state  E ̇ = gE and  U ̇ = gU, we obtain
  E − U =  BY _______  
r − g + x/u. 
Substituting for  (E − U) in the asset equations  (8) and  (9) , yields
  U =  [bY +  [(1 − u)x/u ]BY  ___________r − g + x/u ]  1 ___ r − g , 
and
  E =  [βπY −  xBY _______  r − g + x/u]  1 ___ r − g , 
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so that
  W =  Y ___ r − g [ub + (1 − u)βπ ]. 
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